DDS online licensure data remains out of date
We’ve raised a number of questions over the past year about the thoroughness and effectiveness of the state’s policies and procedures for inspecting and licensing group homes for people with intellectual disabilities. (See here and here.)
Unfortunately, we were unsuccessful in persuading the Legislature’s Children, Families, and Persons with Disabilities Committee to hold a hearing on the issues we raised.
But in response to our concerns, the Department of Developmental Services did indicate it was making efforts to update group home licensure reports on its website that we found were sometimes years out of date.
These licensure reports provide both information about the results of inspections of the vendors’ group homes and the type and duration of the license or licenses each vendor has been granted. The licenses are normally granted for two-year periods, so any such licensure reports that are more than two years old are, by definition, out of date.
In May of this year, DDS Commissioner Elin Howe stated in a letter to Representative Kay Khan, co-chair of the Children and Families Committee, that in addition to updating the licensure reports on the DDS website, licensure follow-up reports were being posted as of that time showing the outcomes of deficiency findings in the original reports.
As a result of these assurances from DDS, we went back and took another look this week at the online DDS licensure data for the same sample of 30 group home vendors that we first examined more than a year ago.
Based on the follow-up we’ve just done, it appears that DDS has taken some steps to update the licensure information on its website; however, much of the information still appears to remain out of date. Of the same 30 providers, licensure reports for 11 were still out of date as of this week, and one report (for the Merrimack Education Center) was no longer posted. That’s now 40 percent of the sample with out of date or missing reports.
Also, the promised follow-up licensure reports or updates were posted for only eight of the 30 vendors in the sample. (See table below with the latest results of our review of the DDS online licensure reports for our vendor sample.) No follow-up reports were posted for any of the 44 vendors listed on the website in the Metro Boston area.
In addition, the licensure reports posted on the DDS website for Behavioral Associates of Massachusetts (BAM) and the Center for Human Development (CHD) — two vendors that we selected for review — remained out of date this week, and no follow-up reports or updates were posted for either vendor. The BAM licensure report was dated April 2009 and the CHD report was dated November 2010.
We had reported in our April 2012 newsletter that DDS didn’t appear to have followed up on numerous deficiencies noted in the BAM and CHD licensure reports. As we noted in the newsletter article, a subsequent licensure report for BAM, dated May 2010, addressed some, but not all, of the licensing deficiencies identified in the previous April 2009 report.
Yet, that same April 2009 document was still the only licensure report for BAM that was posted on the DDS site as of this week. We had received the subsequent May 2010 licensure report from DDS in February of this year in response to a Public Records request. By the way, even that May 2010 report would have been out of date by now had it been posted on the DDS site.
Similarly, the November 2010 licensure report for CHD is now out of date because the two-year license for the vendor was listed in that report as valid through October 2012.
As we reported in the same April 2012 newsletter article, the November 2010 CHD report had cited the vendor for failing to report three incidents of abuse or neglect to the state Disabled Persons Protection Commission. In response to our same Public Records request, we received a follow-up report on CHD, dated December 2010, in February. Yet, as of this week, that December 2010 follow-up report had not been posted on the DDS site.
We sent an email message to DDS Commissioner Howe asking why it is taking so long to replace out-of-date licensure reports on the DDS website and why so few follow-up reports appear to have been posted. We cc’d Rep. Khan’s general counsel on the message. So far, we haven’t heard back from either Howe’s or Khan’s offices.
Results of COFAR review of DDS online group home licensure reports as of the week of November 5, 2012
| DDS Vendor | Date of licensure report posted online | Status of posted report | Follow-up reports or updates posted |
| Central-West Region | |||
| Aditus, Inc. | July 2011 | Current | None |
| Behaviorial Health Network, Inc. | October 2011 | Current | None |
| Center for Human Development, Inc. | November 2010 | Out of date | None |
| Evergreen Center, Inc. | May 2010 | Out of date | None |
| Independent Living for Adults with Special Needs, Inc. | September 2010 | Out of date | None |
| Mass Mentor | January 2012 | Current | None |
| Nonotuck Resource Associates, Inc. | April 2012 | Current | May 2012 |
| New England Center for Children, Inc. | March 2011 | Current | None |
| Seven Hills Foundation, Inc. | October 2011 | Current | November 2011 |
| Western Mass. Training Consortium, Inc. | May 2010 | Out of date | None |
| Northeast Region | |||
| American Training, Inc. | December 2009 | Out of date | November 2011 |
| Central Middlesex Arc, Inc. | September 2008 | Out of date | None |
| Fidelity House, Inc. | April 2012 | Current | July 2012 |
| Merrimack Education Center | No report posted | Unknown | August 2011 |
| Minuteman Arc for Human Services, Inc. | July 2008 | Out of date | None |
| Project Cope, Inc. | June 2011 | Current | August 2011 |
| Southeast Region | |||
| Arc of Cape Cod, Inc. | March 2011 | Current | None |
| Behavioral Associates of Mass., Inc. | April 2009 | Out of date | None |
| Cardinal Cushing Centers, Inc. | May 2012 | Current | None |
| Cerebral Palsy of Mass., Inc. | June 2011 | Current | September 2011 |
| Kennedy Donovan Center, Inc. | October 2010 | Out of date | November 2010, August 2011 |
| Road to Responsibility, Inc. | June 2008 | Out of date | None |
| Work, Inc. | November 2007 | Out of date | None |
| Metro Boston Region | |||
| Charles River Arc, Inc. | May 2011 | Current | None |
| Delta Projects, Inc. | August 2011 | Current | None |
| Justice Resource Institute, Inc. | August 2011 | Current | None |
| North Suffolk MHA, Inc. | April 2011 | Current | None |
| Till, Inc. | August 2011 | Current | None |
| Vinfen, Inc. | December 2010 | Out of date as of Nov. 8, 2012 | None |
| Walnut Street Center, Inc. | May 2012 | Current | None |
DDS finds a creative way to ‘comply’ with court order on IQ regs
The state Department of Developmental Services has found what appears to be a creative response to a recent court order that it redraft regulations that had allowed it to deny eligibility for services to persons with apparent intellectual disabilities.
The problem in our view is the Department’s response, in the form of new “emergency” eligibility regulations, creates the appearance of compliance with the order of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals without complying in reality. In fact, we think these new regulations would maintain the Department’s discretion to deny eligibility to a potentially large number of intellectually disabled people.
In what had appeared to be a big victory for people denied eligibility by DDS, the appeals court declared on July 23 that eligibility regulations, which the Department had adopted in 2006, were invalid. Those regulations gave the Department the latitude to deny services to anyone who scored above a 70 on an IQ test, even though the person seeking services might meet the statutory definition of intellectual disability in Massachusetts. That statute defines an intellectually disabled person as someone who is “substantially limited in his ability to learn or adapt.”
So what was the Department’s creative response to the court’s ruling that it must change the regulations? It was to state in the the new emergency regulations that the Department itself was now the “clinical authority” upon which clinical judgments regarding intelligence will be made.
It seems to us that this “solution” will allow DDS to continue to deny services to anyone scoring above a 70, while appearing to have complied with the appeals court ruling. DDS has scheduled a public hearing on the emergency regulations for Nov. 15 at 1 p.m. at the Worcester Public Library. COFAR joins the Disability Law Center and the Arc of Massachusetts in opposing the DDS’s disingenuous regulatory move.
The appeals court stated that DDS’s eligibility regulations prior to 2006 were consistent with the state law because they did specify a clinical authority — the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) — in defining intellectual disability. The AIDD’s guidelines in determining intellectual disability do not refer to “a bright-line IQ cutoff score” in making eligibility determinations, according to the appeals court.
The appeals court described the reference to clinical authorities in the DDS regulations prior to 2006 as a “statutory anchor” in establishing whether an applicant for services has an intellectual disability. Without such an anchor, the Department’s definition of intellectual disability had actually become “a moving target,” according to the court.
In now designating itself as the clinical authority in making eligibility determinations, DDS does not provide the anchor that the court intended.
It’s as if a judge had ordered a driver to obey the speed limit on a given road, and the driver were to say, “Okay, I’ll obey the speed limit, but the limit will be whatever I decide to set it at.” A judge wouldn’t be likely to buy that argument, and we don’t think the Massachusetts Court of Appeals will buy DDS’s new emergency regulations either.
More questions about the Glavin land deal
Suppose a couple owned a house, and one day, the husband stated that they couldn’t afford to live there anymore and would have to move out. However, rather than putting the house up for sale, he said he planned to let a friend live in it for a dollar a year.
Might the wife not object and say maybe they could afford to stay there if they didn’t need the income from a sale of the property?
Isn’t this same sort of giveaway that the administration has just agreed to concerning 69 acres of state-owned land at the Glavin Regional Center, which has been targeted for closure as of next July?
As we previously noted here, the governor signed a bill into law in August to lease 69 acres of land at Glavin for $1 a year for the next 25 years to the Town of Shrewsbury. The land subject to the lease consists of 15 acres currently used as soccer fields and 54 acres of farmland.
The Worcester Telegram & Gazette reported in 2010 that the total amount of land at Glavin is “more than 120 acres” and had been assessed at $22.36 million. Thus, the land that has been effectively given to the town in this case could be worth as much as $12.9 million.
Many people seem to think we oppose the continued use of open space at Glavin for recreational and agricultural uses. That’s not the case. Our main question here is what happened to the deliberative process that the administration promised with regard to the disposition of the land?
We ask this question not because we want to see this land sold or used for any particular purpose. But like the wife in the house giveaway scenario above, we question the administration’s assertion that it can no longer afford to keep Glavin open and must evict its longtime residents. If closing Glavin is about saving money, why effectively give almost $13 million worth of land away without going through the promised reuse process?
In 2008, the administration announced it was closing the Glavin, Fernald, Monson, and Templeton developmental centers, contending there would be a fiscal savings in doing so. In making the closure announcement, the administration expressly stated that disposition of the land at those centers would be subject to a “collaborative” reuse-committee planning process.
Legislation was subsequently enacted into law to set up land reuse committees for the Fernald Center (Chapter 149 of the Acts of 2004, S. 402) and for the Monson and Templeton Centers (Chapter 59 of the Acts of 2009). However, a bill filed in January 2009 to establish a similar land reuse committee for the Glavin Center never got out of the Bonding Committee.
The Glavin land reuse bill, which had been filed by then state Representative Karyn Polito, had stated that the proposed reuse committee “will be mindful of the rights of current Glavin residents, and their need for adequate and appropriate housing, clinical services, and appropriate staffing…”
Why Polito’s bill died and was never refiled is a mystery to us.
Interestingly, in February 2010, the administration proposed to sell what appears to be the same parcels of land at Glavin that it is now prepared to lease to the town for $1 a year. Area legislators opposed the planned sale of the land.
What caused the about-face on the administration’s part from wanting to sell the Glavin land with no formal reuse process in place, to agreeing to effectively give the land away, with no formal reuse process in place?
We’ll continue to ask these questions, hoping for some answers.
State’s decision to lease Glavin land for $1 raises questions
For years we’ve heard from the administration that it’s necessary to close the Glavin Regional Center and three other developmental centers in Massachusetts because the centers have become too expensive to operate.
But if these closures are about saving money, why has the administration agreed to essentially give away 69 acres of state land at Glavin to the Town of Shrewsbury? In agreeing in August to lease the land to the town for $1 a year for the next 25 years, the state will forego potentially millions of dollars it would have gotten from the sale of that land.
Our main question really is this: Why has the administration reached this deal with the town outside of what would normally be a formal and deliberative process to determine the best options for reuse of the land? The 69 acres, which include soccer fields and farmland surrounding the Glavin Center, comprise at least 62 percent of the total Glavin campus.
For the past eight years, the state has been involved in a painstaking and often contentious reuse process with the City of Waltham over the 200 acres at the site of the Fernald Developmental Center, which has also been targeted for closure. That process has brought parties from all sides to the table, and has involved public hearings and a report by a planning consultant.
No such reuse process has yet occurred at Glavin, and yet a decision has already effectively been made about the disposition of a majority of the acreage at that site. It’s a decision, moreover, that is a great financial deal for the Town of Shrewsbury, but not for the state, which is supposedly so strapped for cash that it has had to evict what were hundreds of longtime residents of the developmental centers from their homes.
Here by the way, is what Governor Patrick had to say this past May about the reuse process at Fernald:
Everybody’s on it (the Fernald reuse process). All the interests, all the factions, and that’s how it should be. I know the city has expressed interest in buying it (a portion of the Fernald land). I don’t think the state’s in a position to give it away. But I think selling to the city, some or all of it, is certainly an option.
So, the state is not in a position to give away any of the Fernald land, yet it is in a position to give away the Glavin land? And why, in the case of Fernald, are all the interests at the table whereas, in the case of Glavin, the only interests at the table were the state and the town?
Both Glavin and Fernald have been targeted by the administration for closure, over the objections of most of the family members and guardians of the residents of those facilities. The administration has repeatedly claimed to the Legislature that it would save up to $40 million a year in closing the Fernald, Glavin, Monson, and Templeton developmental centers. Yet the administration and other opponents of the centers have repeatedly opposed an independent study of the cost of closing those facilities.
The $1 lease arrangement at Glavin stems from a home rule petition that was presented by Shrewsbury to the state Legislature in May. The lease involves both a 15-acre tract that has housed town soccer fields for many years and a 54-acre tract of farmland. The Legislature approved the lease and the governor signed the bill in August.
We’re not opposed to preserving the land at Glavin as farmland or as soccer fields. But we question why this lease arrangement for 69 acres of land was done outside of a formal disposition process for the land and why it was done in such a seeming hurry.
We’ve filed Public Records requests with the state for records concerning plans for the reuse of the Glavin property. We’d like to know what’s going on.
Rep. Haddad endorses independent study for Glavin Center
House Speaker Pro Tempore Patricia Haddad, who just spearheaded a successful effort to block the immediate closure of Taunton State Hospital, supports undertaking an independent study prior to the closure of the state-run Glavin Regional Center in Shrewsbury for persons with intellectual disabilities.
Speaking at a meeting Tuesday at the State House attended by Glavin family members, legislators and their staffs, and officials of the Department of Developmental Services, Haddad said the independent study should cover “the entire DMH (Department of Mental Health) and DDS system.”
“Someone has to be the first to say we’re not afraid to have an outside study done to tell us what’s wrong and what’s right,” Haddad said. She maintained that internal studies done by the administration that showed a savings in closing Glavin and other developmental centers in Massachusetts “are asking people to trust the results.”
The Tuesday meeting was organized by Republican Representative Matthew Beaton, whose Shrewsbury-based district is home to Glavin. In 2008, the Patrick administration targeted the Glavin, Fernald, Monson, and Templeton developmental centers for closure as of the end of the current fiscal year.
Fernald has remained open pending the outcome of appeals filed by the guardians of 14 remaining residents. The Monson center was officially closed last month.
During the Tuesday meeting, I pointed out on behalf of COFAR that the planned closures of the four developmental centers will leave only two locations in Massachusetts for federally regulated Intermediate Level Facility (ICF) care. Those remaining facilities are located in Danvers in the northeastern corner of the state, and Wrentham in southeastern Massachusetts. The administration has deferred a decision on whether to close the Danvers facility.
During the meeting, Will Dumont of Brookfield, the father of a resident of the centrally located Glavin Center, said it would be much more difficult to regularly visit his son if he were transferred hours away to Wrentham.
Sheila Bailey, another family member, said her brother had suffered abuse in a facility that he had lived in prior to coming to Glavin. “It was like a cloud was lifted when he got to Glavin,” Bailey said. “He finally had a life there.”
Beaton maintained that Al Bacotti, a former director of the Glavin Center, who has taken an active role in opposing its closure, maintained to him that in the next 10 to 15 years, the loss of the ICF-level care provided by facilities such as Glavin will force the state to rebuild them.
DDS Deputy Commissioner Larry Tummino said he did not dispute that the services at Glavin are excellent. He contended that “we can structure that clinical expertise in the community.” Tummino also maintained that guardians of some 31 residents at Glavin have agreed thus far to move those residents to other locations.
That latter claim from Tummino brought a sharp rebuke from Roland Charpentier, the president of the Glavin family association. Charpentier said the guardians who agreed to leave Glavin did so “because they were scared to death that Glavin is going to close.”
Haddad also was critical of the administration’s contention that the services provided by facilities such as Glavin and Taunton state can be replicated in the community system. “There are more horror stories than good stories in the private sector,” Haddad said. “You’re asking people to trust a system that has a lot of flaws,” she said to Tummino and a second DDS official who attended the Tuesday meeting.
“This is not something you can just say ‘it’s going to be okay,” Haddad added.
Haddad said she was nervous about what the independent study approved for Taunton State Hospital might conclude, but that she believes the outcome will be support for “a continuum of care” in the mental health system that would include Taunton State.
Speaking specifically about the plan to close Glavin, Haddad maintained that it is harmful to remove intellectually disabled people from their longtime homes. “People cling to the people and things that they know,” she said.
Trial in DDS abuse case caps two years of frustration
Sheila Paquette’s two-year quest to obtain justice in the alleged assault of her intellectually disabled brother came to a crushing end on July 30 as a jury in Falmouth District Court took less than half an hour to acquit the alleged assailant.
We have no desire to use the media to convict the man who was found innocent in this case. What we do want to point out here is how this case illustrates the nonstop frustration that intellectually disabled victims of crimes and their advocates are likley to encounter as they deal with a bureaucratic system that is supposedly intended to help them. In reality, it does nothing of the sort.
Here is a reprint of my op-ed on this case, which ran on Sunday in The Springfield Republican:
Viewpoint: State must protect its most vulnerable
By David Kassel
The jury did its job on July 30 in a trial of a care giver in a West Springfield group home who was alleged to have assaulted an intellectually disabled man more than two years ago in Falmouth on Cape Cod.
But did the government do its job? After less than half an hour of deliberation, the jury acquitted John Saunders of assaulting John Burns while they were on a weekend trip to the Cape from the group home operated by the Center for Human Development.
Burns suffered two black eyes and other injuries in the alleged assault.
Certainly, this was a difficult case to prove. The key witness was an intellectually disabled man who is Burns’ roommate in the West Springfield residence. When the case finally did come to trial on July 30, the witness’s account of the alleged assault had substantially changed.
What concerns us about this case is not the outcome, however, but rather the overall performance of the District Attorney’s office and other agencies entrusted with the protection of some of the most vulnerable members of our society.
Those agencies did not appear to demonstrate a strong commitment to working together in pursuit of justice for the alleged victim.
For instance, Sheila Paquette, of Westfield, Burns’ sister and guardian, ultimately ended up filing the assault charge against Saunders herself in July 2010 when she became convinced no law enforcement agencies were going to do so.
It was only after she filed the charge that the state Disabled Persons Protection Commission sent a state trooper to her house to investigate, she said.
After that, the case languished for months at a time, beset by bureaucratic snafus and witness no-shows that caused the trial to be postponed four times.
When the trial finally took place, the D.A.’s prosecution effort seemed half-hearted. Among other questions we have was why no one from the DPPC or its state police unit was called to testify at the trial.
The DPPC had issued a comprehensive report on the incident in February 2011, which found sufficient evidence to conclude that Burns was “seriously injured” by Saunders.
Assistant Cape & Islands District Attorney Kerry Whalen, who headed the criminal investigation of the case, contended to us that any testimony given by either the DPPC or state police investigators in the trial would have been considered hearsay because those investigators had not interviewed Saunders.
The DPPC report, however, stated that a DPPC investigator did interview Saunders by telephone. It is concerning to us that there appears to be no communication process in place to ensure that DPPC investigators testify in criminal proceedings such as this case.
Moreover, even if testimony from the DPPC would have been considered hearsay, that would raise a further question about the D.A.’s performance.
Why did none of the staff of Burns’ group home testify at the trial, other than Saunders and one other caretaker who had been on the Cape Cod trip?
The DPPC report stated that other staff in the West Springfield residence had observed Saunders to be “speaking in a derogatory manner” about Burns in his presence later on the day of the alleged assault. This never came out at the trial either.
If nothing else, this case has shown that there is a potentially serious lack of communication and cooperation between the key agencies that are charged with protecting the safety of some of our state’s most vulnerable citizens.
It also raises the question for us whether prosecutors take criminal cases involving abuse and neglect of disabled persons seriously enough.
We hope lawmakers and other policy makers will consider changes that are badly needed to ensure that the disabled in Massachusetts have adequate access to justice when crimes are committed against them.
(More information about the July 30 trial in this case and the questions it raises can be found in the August 2012 issue of The COFAR Voice newsletter and a special August edition of The Advocacy Network News, the newsletter of the Advocacy Network, a COFAR member organization.)
What do the academic studies say about community-based care?
A review of the literature
Introduction
In the past two decades, there has been a major shift around the country in care for the intellectually disabled, as tens of thousands of people have been moved from larger congregate facilities to community-based group homes.
(Since congregate facilities, also known as Intermediate Care Facilities for the developmentally disabled (ICFs/DD), are generally referred to as institutions, I will use that latter term here, despite its negative connotations.)
This shift in care, accompanied by a large-scale privatization of residential and other services, has engendered much debate among policymakers and advocates for the disabled.
That debate has played out for close to two decades in Massachusetts, as governors from Weld to Romney to Patrick have moved to close state developmental centers and place their residents in a mix of public and privatized facilities. While the Patrick administration has, in many cases, moved people from facilities slated for closure to the Wrentham Developmental Center, the administration has stated that its ultimate goal is to move people to community based care.
In a statement in 2007 announcing the decision to close the Fernald Developmental Center, the first of four such centers that the administration has targeted for closure, Secretary of Health and Human Services JudyAnn Bigby stated the following:
The state’s decision (to close Fernald) is consistent with a national shift away from institutional care in favor of community living. Decades of research indicate that community settings offer people with mental retardation the best care available and the highest quality of life. The Patrick Administration believes that community living is the best environment in which to ensure family connections, service access, education, training employment and full inclusion for people with mental retardation.
Has the deinstitutionalization effort been an unqualified success, and does academic research support that claim?
I reviewed academic research on the topic of deinstitutionalization of the intellectually disabled. Much has been written in scholarly journals on this topic in the past 20 years, and I think it would be safe to say that the writers of those articles have given out both good and bad grades on the impact of deinstitutionalization on the well-being, health and longevity of the people involved.
Specifically, the studies I reviewed found that:
- Many people who were deinstitutionalized did indeed experience improvements in the quality of their lives and adaptive skills after being transferred to community-based group homes.
However, many of those same studies reported that:
- Many deinstitutionalized people have encountered a lack of adequate medical care in the community system, and quality of life and adaptive skills often did not improve for those who had the most profound levels of disability or who were older.
I’ll first discuss the studies I reviewed on the well-being of deinstitutionalized persons and then will discuss an academic controversy over a study that found a higher death rate among people who were deinstitutionalized in California than what would have been expected in the institutions they were moved from. (A list of the articles I reviewed can be found at the end of this post.)
Quality of life studies on deinstitutionalized persons
One of the more comprehensive reviews I was able to find of well-being or quality-of-life studies of deinstitutionalized persons was a 2011 article by Monali Chowdhury and Betsey Benson in The Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities.
Chowdhury and Benson reported that their review indicated that relocation from institutions to community-based settings had a “general positive impact on life quality of participants.”
At the same time, Chowdhury and Benson stated that many of the studies they reviewed found that “improvements were most prominent shortly after the move and plateaued after a year.” While some studies showed gains in adaptive behavior in former institutional residents who had been moved to the community, they wrote, other studies “have shown neither significant increase in adaptive skills nor the maintenance of modest gains when moving to community group homes.”
Chowdhury and Benson also reported that in a number of studies, “participants continued to have low levels of community integration,” and there was “some evidence that healthcare needs might not be adequately met in the community.”
A 2007 article in Current Opinion in Psychiatry by J. Beadle-Brown et al. contained the following summation of the academic literature on deinstitutionalization of the intellectually disabled:
Work on deinstitutionalization continues to show that outcomes are better in the community than in institutional care, but recent papers highlight that there is more to deinstitutionalization than just hospital closure. Just moving people out of institutions into community settings does not bring about automatic improvement in quality of life in terms of choice and inclusion as well as self-identity and access to effective healthcare and treatment. This is especially true for people with more severe intellectual disabilities as well as complex needs such as challenging behaviour.
Among the other studies I reviewed that drew similar conclusions that transfers from institutional to community care were often but not always successful was a 2010 overview of research by Patricia Noonan Walsh et al. in The Journal of Policy and Pratice in Intellectual Disabilities.
Citing what they termed “post-deinstitutionalization” studies that they had reviewed, Noonan Walsh and her colleagues stated that these studies provided “consistent evidence for greater choice, self-determination, and participation in community-based activities in smaller settings, but no evidence for greater physical health or material well-being…”
In addition, a 1998 study in the journal Mental Handicap Research by Andrew Bratt and Rob Johnston of five intellectually disabled adults who had left a hospital to live in a “bungalow” in Exeter, England, concluded that while the staff considered the group as whole to be better off after the move:
…little evidence of integration being achieved within the local community was recorded; and there was little or no evidence of individuals being supported in ways that increased their competence, particularly in relation to participating at a simple level in routine domestic tasks.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the discordant findings among many researchers over the impact of deinstitutionalization is the difficulty in measuring that impact. That difficulty may have contributed to the disagreement among many policymakers and advocates as to whether deinsitutionalization has been beneficial or not.
Chowdhury and Benson noted that many of the studies they reviewed on deinstitutionalization relied on interviews with intellectually disabled persons to determine quality-of-life differences between institutions and group homes. However, other studies have found, they stated, that these interviewing techniques can be compromised by “response biases,” which “can seriously damage the reliability and validity of self-report data on subjective QoL (Quality of Life) in individuals with ID (intellectual disabilities).”
One 2000 study, for instance, by Jonathan Perry and David Felce in Mental Retardation, reported that two thirds of the respondents in a sample of 154 adults with intellectual disabilities were either unable to respond to questions in a structured interview about their quality of life or exhibited response bias. The authors noted that the most common form of response bias among people with intellectual disabilities is “the tendency to acquiesce, that is, to say yes to questions regardless of their content” (emphasis in the original).”
Chowdhury and Benson further noted that given those problems with response bias, “a knowledgeable proxy,” such as a staff member or parent, is often asked to respond on behalf of an intellectually disabled person to quality-of-life survey questions. However, they stated using such proxies is “usually not seen as an accurate substitute” for measuring QoL of people with ID.”
The California mortality study controversy
A major area of disagreement among academic researchers appears to center around attempts to determine whether moving intellectually disabled persons out of institutions causes them to die earlier than they would have had they stayed in those facilities. This disagreement as well has spilled out into the policymaking and advocacy worlds.
I was was recently criticized, for instance, by a leading opponent in Massachusetts of developmental centers for the intellectually disabled for citing a one such mortality study on deinstitutionalization that had been done on residents who were moved from institutions to community group homes in California in the 1990s.
In a recent post calling for saving the Glavin Regional Center in Massachusetts from closure, I wrote that a 2005 paper by Robert Shavelle, David Strauss, and Steven Day in The Journal of Data Science, reported that the authors had analyzed data on more than 1,800 children and adults who had been dinstitutionalized in California between 1993 and 1996. The authors found that as of 1999, there were 81 deaths among those who had been transferred from institutions to community-based group homes. Using statistical regression, Shavelle et al. reported that the the death rate represented a 47 percent increase in mortality over that expected in institutions.
Shavelle and Strauss concluded that the increase in deaths appeared to reflect less intensive medical care and supervision available in the community.
I wrote the post on behalf of COFAR, a nonprofit organizaton that I consult for and that advocates on behalf of the intellectually disabled and their families.
COFAR, along with Strauss and Shavelle, were criticized by Gary Blumenthal, president of the Massachusetts Association of Developmental Disabilities Providers (ADDP), who wrote in a comment (under the user name “dcjayhawk”) to my post that:
COFAR…attempts to frighten families by telling them of higher mortality rates in community programs versus ICF (Intermediate Care Facility) programs by citing a flawed 1993-1998 California mortality study whose methodology and findings have been discredited by multiple expert researchers…
Blumenthal went on to cite four studies that he claimed discredited the work of Shavelle and Strauss. (More about that below.) The ADDP, which represents nonprofit operators of group homes in Massachusetts that contract with the state Department of Developmental Services, supports the closure of all remaining developmental centers in Massachusetts and the transfer of all of their residents to community-based group home programs.
The California mortality research of Shavelle and Strauss was also criticized by Connecticut Department of Developmental Services Commissioner Terrence Macy, who has stated that he wants to move residents out of the state-run Southbury Training School in Connecticut and into privately run group homes. In a recent letter to another client of mine, The Southbury Training School (STS) Home & School Association, Macy maintained that:
The California study is well over twenty years old. Its research methodology of contrasting deaths that occurred in the community to “those expected in institutions” is no longer a viable research methodolgy. I would doubt this research design would even be accepted for publication in today’s research periodicals. That study has been replaced with a large number of studies that have been conducted throughout the country over a long period of time. Many of these studies are longitudinal so by design they follow persons who have moved over extended periods. This significant body of rigorous studies has consistently concluded that persons who have transitioned out of institutions in fact have benefited from placement in the community.
But have the Shavelle study and earlier versions of it by Strauss really been discredited and are they really over 20 years old?
In answer to that second question, I would note that Strauss and co-author, Theodore Kastner, first published findings of a higher mortality rate among deinstitutionalized persons in California in 1996 in The American Journal on Mental Retardation. The article by Shavelle and Strauss, which I cited in my BMG blog post, was an update of the original study, and was published in 2005 in The Journal of Data Science. Thus, even Strauss’s earliest findings do not appear to be more than 16 years old, and the work done by him and his colleagues on this topic was accepted by a peer-reviewed periodical only seven years ago.
Strauss’s research website lists a total of 10 studies and one commentary on mortality issues associated with deinstitutionalization that he co-authored with a total of eight colleagues. Strauss himself is professor emeritus of statistics at the University of California, while Shavelle has been a visiting assistant professor at the University of California and has a Ph.D. in statistics. Kastner, a physician, has held associate professorships at the New Jersey Medical School and the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons.
I reviewed all four of the studies cited by Blumenthal of the ADDP as having discredited Strauss’s methodology and findings. What I found is that, as with the studies on the quality of life of intellectually disabled persons, studies on mortality rates of people who have been deinstitutionalized often reach differing conclusions.
I also found that while three of the four studies cited by Blumenthal did dispute the mortality findings of Strauss and his colleagues in the 1990s in California, two of those three were largely respectful of Strauss’s work. (More about the exception below.) Strauss and his colleagues, as far as I can tell, have not been discredited. The fourth study cited by Blumenthal as having discredited Strauss’s California mortality studies actually did not directly address that topic at all.
I would also note that each of the studies cited by Blumenthal that did dispute the mortality findings of Strauss and his colleagues was done by researchers who disclosed consulting relationships with state agencies that had or were seeking to close developmental centers. In my view, those relationships raise questions about the independence of those studies.
As noted, only one of the articles cited by Blumenthal was actually overtly critical of Strauss et al. and their methodology. That critical article, titled “Commentary on the mortality issue,” by James Conroy and Miriam Adler, was published in the journal Mental Retardation, in October 1998.
In the commentary, Conroy and Adler cited a 1995 study they undertook on the transfers of residents from the Pennhurst Developmental Center in Pennsylvania, and stated that they had found a “sharply decreased risk of death when people moved from institution to community.” They termed Strauss’s 1996 finding of a higher death rate in the community system “utterly false” and compared it to the discredited discovery of cold fusion.
It should be noted that Kastner returned the favor, critiquing Conroy’s methodology in a number of papers, including a 2000 article in Mental Retardation concerning Conroy’s Pennhurst closure study. Kastner also co-authored a 2006 article with Kevin Walsh in the same journal, titled “The Hissom Closure in Oklahoma: Errors and Interpretation Problems in Conroy et al. (2003).”
In that 2006 article, Walsh and Kastner charged that the research of Conroy and his colleagues had been “seriously compromised by data collection problems and discrepancies between reported findings and those obtained when the analyses were replicated.”
Several of Conroy’s reports were also criticized in the 1990s by former staffers of the California Department of Developmental Services, according to the May 1996 issue of Outreach, a publication of the California Association of Psychiatric Technicians. The journal article, titled “Conroy Reports Controversy,” also stated that Philip Bondy, who is a former chair of Yale’s Department of Internal Medicine and a Southbury Training School Home & School Association Board member, was critical of a study done by Conroy on the outcomes of the closure of the Mansfield Training School in Connecticut.
Bondy emailed me that his criticism was based on Conroy’s reliance in the Mansfield study on quality-of-life interviews with attendants as proxies for former Mansfield residents who had been moved to community-based group homes. “There is no reason to believe that the attendants were unprejudiced,” Bondy wrote, “since they were employed in providing community care and might reasonably expect to give favorable answers. Although Conroy quoted statistics in support of his conclusions, I believe that they were based on faulty data,” he added.
Bondy is a former editor in chief of both The Journal of Clinical Investigation and The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine.
Conroy’s resume indicates that he authored or co-authored hundreds of reports on the well-being of deinstitutionalized residents, most of which appear to have been submitted to state agencies running ICFs and community-based facilities or to entities such as the Institutional Closure Commission of Ohio. I think that may raise some questions about his independence in researching this issue.
A second article cited by Blumenthal as having discredited the work of Strauss and his colleagues on mortality rates in California was a 1998 study by Kevin O’Brien and E.S. Zaharia. The study, titled “Recent mortality patterns in California,” was published in the same issue of Mental Retardation in which the Conroy commentary was published.
The O’Brien and Zaharia study found no increased risk of death in the community for the same population that Strauss and his colleagues had studied. But far from discrediting Strauss’s results, O’Brien and Zaharia stated that the reasons for the discrepancies between the two studies were “unclear.” They acknowledged that due to validity prolems with databases used to analyze the number of deaths, “there may have been quite a bit of contamination in all of our analyses.”
In a separate commentary in the same issue of the journal (titled “Is it Life Threatening to Live in the Community?”), O’Brien and Zaharia stated: “We believe that the suggestions made by Strauss et al. (1998) (about closely monitoring initial placements of residents in community settings) should receive thoughtful debate.”
O’Brien and Zaharia disclosed in their papers that they were consultants to the California Department of Developmental Services.
A third study cited by Blumenthal as discrediting the Strauss studies was done by Paul Lerman, Dawn Hall Apgar, and Tameeka Jordan and published in in Mental Retardation in August 2003. This study did not find evidence that moving residents out of a developmental center in New Jersey and into the community caused more deaths. However, the authors concluded that the difference between their results and Strauss’s findings could be due to variations in policies in the two different states on deinstitutionalization or to differences in population characteristics.
Lerman et al. also noted several limitations to their own study, including limitations on the reliability of their behavioral variables. The study was hardly an effort to discredit Strauss and his colleagues.
The Lerman study, by the way, was funded by the New Jersey Division of Developmental Disabilities.
The final study cited by Blumenthal as discrediting the Strauss studies was actually concerned with the well-being of people transferred from nursing homes to community residences. The 1998 study, by Tamar Heller, Alan Factor, and Kelly Hsieh, in The American Journal on Mental Retardation, mentioned Strauss’s research in passing and was not in any way critical of it.
In a defense of their work, published in the same 1998 issue of Mental Retardation as the Conroy and O’Brien and Zaharia articles, Strauss and Shavelle maintained that they were not attempting to evaluate “the merits of institutional versus community living,” and were not arguing that persons living in the community should move or return to a state institution.” Instead, they said, “[o]ur concern was with the quality of health care and supervision currently available in the community.”
In that commentary, Strauss and Shavelle cited a Congressional subcommittee report, newspaper reports on avoidable deaths in California group homes, and a critical report on the community system in California by the federal Health Care Finance Agency as buttressing their findings.
Conclusion
This review of the academic literature on institutional versus community-based care for the intellectually disabled is admittedly far from exhaustive. But I think most researchers in this field would probably agree that I’m correct in concluding at least one thing about the research that has been done on this topic: That is that there is no clear consensus among scholars that either system of care is better in all respects for all intellectually disabled people.
Both of the advocacy organizations that I work for believe that the community-based system is appropriate and beneficial for the majority of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. At the same time, both organizations also maintain that for a portion of this population with severe and profound levels of disability as well as those who who are older or have complicated medical conditions, institutions continue to play a vital role in their care.
Both COFAR and the Southbury Training School Home & School Association are nonprofit organizations that advocate for families and guardians of intellectually disabled residents of state-run facilities. Many of those facilities have been targeted for closure by state administrators who, in many cases, appear to believe that all intellectually disabled persons should live in the community system.
I hope this survey of the literature on this topic will persuade at least some of those administrators as well as legislators, policymakers, and others that those in the academic community, who have looked at this issue objectively and scientifically, have not reached a consensus that the community is better for everyone. Instead, the scholarly literature on this topic appears to support the contention that “one size doesn’t fit all.”
References for this post:
Beadle-Brown, J.; J. Mansell; and A. Kozma, “Deinstitutionalization in intellectual disabilities. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 2007, 20(5):437-42.
Bratt, A. and R. Johnston, “Changes in life style for young adults with profound handicaps following discharge from hospital care into a ‘second generation’ housing project,” Mental Handicap Research, 1998, 1(1): 49–74.
Chowdhury, M., and B. Benson, “Deinstitutionalization and Quality of Life of Individuals With Intellectual Disability: A Review of the International Literature,” Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities, 2011, 8(4): 256–265.
Conroy, J., and M. Adler, “Commentary on the mortality issue,” Mental Retardation, 1998, 36(5).
Cullen, C.; M. Whoriskey, K. Mackenzie, W. Mitchell, K. Ralston, S. Shreeve, and A. Stanley, “The effects of deinstitutionalization on adults with learning disabilities,” Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 1995, 39(6): 484–494.
Heller, T.; A. Factor, and K. Hsieh, “Impact of age and transitions out of nursing homes for adults with developmental disabilities,” The American Journal on Mental Retardation, 1998, 103(3).
Kastner, T., “On the Need for Policy Requiring Data-Sharing Among Researchers Publishing in AAMR Journals: Critique of Conroy and Adler (1998),” Mental Retardation, 2000, 38(6): 519-529.
Lerman, P.; D. Apgar, and T. Jordan, “Findings of a Controlled Research Design in New Jersey,” Mental Retardation, 2003, 41(4): 225-236.
Noonan Walsh, P.; E. Emerson, C. Lobb, C. Hatton, V. Bradley, R. Schalock, and C. Moseley, “Supported Accommodation for People With Intellectual Disabilities and Quality of Life: An Overview,” Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities, 2010, 7(2): 137–142.
O’Brien, K., and E.S. Zaharia, “Recent mortality patterns in California,” Mental Retardation, 1998, 36(5).
O’Brien, K., and E.S. Zaharia, “Is it life threatening to live in the community? Commentary,” Mental Retardation, 1988, 36(5).
Perry, J. and D. Felce, “Subjective and Objective Quality of Life Assessment: Responsiveness, Response Bias, and Resident: ProxyConcordance,” Mental Retardation, 2002, 40 (6): 445–456
Shavelle, R.; D. Strauss, and S. Day, “Deinstitutionalization in California: Mortality of Persons with Developmental Disabilities After Transfer Into Community Care, 1997-1999,” Journal of Data Science, 2005, 3(4): 371-380.
Strauss, D. and T. Kastner, (1996). “Comparative mortality of people with mental retardation in institutions and the community,” American Journal on Mental Retardation, 1996, 101(1): 26-40.
Strauss, D. and R. Shavelle, “Policy Implications of Mortality Research: What Can We Learn From the California Mortality Studies?” Mental Retardation, 1998, 36(5).
Walsh, K., and T. Kastner, “The Hissom Closure in Oklahoma: Errors and Interpretation Problems in Conroy et al.,” Mental Retardation, 2003, 44( 5).
Weismann, C., and K. Hearn, “Conroy Reports Controversy,” Outreach, May 1996.
DDS IQ score regulations ruled invalid
Some cautions about the ‘Real Lives Bill’
We strongly support giving intellectually disabled individuals and their families and guardians as much choice as possible in the care and services they receive.
We’re not convinced, though, that proposed legislation dubbed “The Real Lives Bill,” does that. The bill (H. 4167) is scheduled to reach the House floor for debate this week.
The language of the bill is intended to promote “self-direction” by persons with disabilities, which is a laudable goal. In a Globe column yesterday, Joan Vennochi maintained that The Real Lives bill is about:
…recognizing the rights of people with disabilities to make choices about how and where to live — and not limiting them to choices made by someone else.
Vennochi made the following point in arguing that there is a need for the bill. She stated:
The current system leaves decisions about how money will be used and for what purpose with providers. If a specific program doesn’t work out for a particular individual, it’s difficult to get out of it. Providers are not eager to lose the revenue stream represented by an unhappy user.
We respect Ms. Vennochi as an excellent columnist. But we are concerned that while this bill might appear to give clients of the Department of Developmental Services the power of choice in providers, it is vaguely drafted and might well have the opposite effect of giving the providers more control over people’s services and over state funding than they currently possess.
At the very least, the bill doesn’t appear to provide for sufficient oversight of its proposed components, including something called “service brokers” and an ill-defined “contingency fund” that would be partly managed by the providers themselves.
Also, we would disagree that the current system leaves it up to the providers about how money will be used and for what purposes.
On that latter point, we would note that decisions about uses and purposes of funding for services are supposed to be specified in an individual’s Individual Support Plan (ISP), which is developed with the input of the individual and his or her guardian, family members, and clinicians. ISPs are required to be rigorously overseen by the DDS. In that sense, therefore, we’re not sure why this bill is needed.
Secondly, before getting to the service brokers and the contingency fund, we would note that while the bill talks about “self direction” for DDS clients, it doesn’t define that term very clearly. For instance, one of the definitions given in the bill of self-direction is:
…the individual is central to and directs the decision making process that will determine which supports are utilized
All well and good, but once again, that is already the function of the ISP process, which is much more carefully spelled out in DDS regulations.
It is also a little puzzling that this bill speaks almost exclusively in terms of the individual DDS client as “directing” services, with almost no mention of family members or guardians. The bill goes as far as to say that individuals with “profound intellectual impairments” are “eligible for self-direction.”
We would note that the courts have in most cases determined that persons with profound intellectual impairments require guardians. It is hard to conceive of people with profound levels of intellectual disability as planning and directing their own services.
As noted, we have some concerns about the language in the bill directing the hiring of “service brokers” who would “assist in the development of a plan of service” and “in the purchase of services” for participating individuals. The bill doesn’t specify who these service brokers would be or how much they would be paid. The bill does state that the individual client can choose a service broker; but, once again, the bill doesn’t appear to give that choice to guardians or family members.
Would these service brokers, by the way, be hired in addition to service coordinators, who are already employed by DDS to help plan, manage, and coordinate services to clients in the DDS community system? That would seem to be a needless duplication of services and attendant costs.
In addition, the bill states that DDS will establish a “contingency fund” to “assist individuals in need of services,” among other purposes. It doesn’t specify how much would be in this fund, but states only that it must contain “sufficient funds for individuals utilizing self-determination and provider mitigation throughout the fiscal year.”
This particular language about the contingency fund strikes us as overly vague, and we are not clear what is meant by “provider mitigation.” It’s not defined in the bill.
Moreover, the bill leaves it up to DDS to develop policy regarding the contingency fund with the assistance of a Self-Determination Advisory Board. That Board would be comprised of, among others, members of the Massachusetts Association of Developmental Disabilities Providers (the ADDP) and the Massachusetts Arc, whose funding comes, to a significant degree, from state contracts. Ms. Vennochi reported that the ADDP is on board with this bill. That is not surprising, considering the key role they would apparently play in setting up this funding source.
We would note that while the bill does contain language that would allow individuals to change service providers if they aren’t happy with their care, we’re not sure that language represents a change from the current situation in Massachusetts.
If an individual or his or her guardian isn’t satisfied with a residence that person is living in, they can ask for a change right now. The bill says DDS must make a good faith effort to assist the individual in finding a suitable alternative, but we would hope that’s the case now.
In sum, we would agree DDS clients need to have more choice in their care and services. But this bill would appear to set up a system that lacks sufficient definition and oversight. We would urge legislators to go back to the drawing board.
The Telegram & Gazette makes the case for Glavin and Taunton State
We often feel that we are alone in the battle to preserve the existing fabric of care in Massachusetts for the developmentally disabled; but every so often, we hear words of encouragement from people with no personal stake in the outcome.
Today’s editorial in The Worcester Telegram & Gazette is a heart-warming case in point. We’re admittedly biased in favor of maintaining the long-time homes of residents of places such as the Glavin Regional Center in Shrewsbury, the Fernald Center in Waltham, the Templeton and Monson Centers, and Taunton State Hospital. We think the Telegram & Gazette editorial makes one of the best cases we’ve seen yet for preserving both Glavin and Taunton State, both of which have been targeted by the administration for closure.
Thus far, the Legislature has come through for Taunton State, having approved funding to keep that facility running pending completion of an independent analysis of the cost of operating it. Unfortunately, the Legisature hasn’t approved the same thing for the Glavin Center. We think the Telegram & Gazette editorial should be sent to every legislator. It’s reproduced below:
Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Worcester Telegam & Gazette
Compassion and the state
The disagreement over the closing of Taunton State Hospital and the effort to reverse closure of the Glavin Regional Center in Shrewsbury might seem to matter to only a few.
But such facilities ably serve some of our most needy individuals. They are staffed with gifted professionals. Most especially, they are places where hope pours in daily from family members and others who cherish their special someone who lives there.
No place that serves people with mental retardation or other serious developmental difficulties is or can possibly be perfect. But despite the holdover label of “institutionalized,” these facilities are alive with love.
Lawmakers should work to override Gov. Patrick’s Sunday veto of $5.1 million to keep Taunton open. And, in the case of Glavin, the Massachusetts Coalition of Families and Advocates Inc. is right to fight to keep the remaining 28 residents of the 63-bed center in their home. State officials intend for all Glavin’s residents to relocate by June 30.
Glavin, which opened 37 years ago, has enjoyed a strong reputation for being a good home and a good neighbor.
During a recent meeting with the Telegram & Gazette’s editorial board, the families of some residents joined other knowledgeable spokesmen in attesting to the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of the care the Glavin Center provides.
Mr. Patrick envisions residents of Glavin and Taunton being served in group homes. For some, group homes work. For these residents, they do not. The reality is that development disability will never adapt to a one-size-fits-all solution. Medium and larger facilities where patients are more closely guarded have a vital role.
The administration argues that group homes will save money, but the money — which amounts to a tiny fraction of the state budget — is not the chief concern.
Rather, that must be the lives of needy individuals and the families who cherish them. The challenge is how to provide appropriate care, case by case. And the answer is that the Glavin Center and Taunton State Hospital are facilities that meet a need that will always exist, conferring dignity, safety and love on the most developmentally needy among us.
If these options cost a bit more than state officials, auditors, and some taxpayers would like, well, they are exactly what our tax dollars should be used for.
Massachusetts claims to be a caring state, a model for the health, education and welfare of its citizens. This is a moment for Mr. Patrick and lawmakers to prove that. Keep Glavin, Taunton and other such places open — welcoming places that work to care for those individuals and their families who need their services so desperately.